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I. INTRODUCTION
The distinction between content-based and content neutral government
actions is fundamental to free speech doctrine. A content-based government
speech restriction receives the most rigorous scrutiny,' which is almost always
fatal.' By contrast, a content neutral speech restriction receives much more
lenient intermediate review.
Within a more narrow, but still substantial, realm, the further distinction
between content-based and viewpoint-based government actions' is crucial to
free speech doctrine as well. When the government assists private speakers, by
funding their speech or providing them access to government property to speak,
the government may define the boundaries of its support on any reasonable
grounds that are not viewpoint-based.
Despite the centrality of these two inquiries to free speech doctrine, the
means of making the determinations remains murky.5 One problem is that the
Court frequently merges the inquiries into whether a government action is
content- and/or viewpoint-based. The result in the content-based/content neutral
inquiry is that the determination often seems driven solely by viewpoint
discrimination concerns. This emphasis in the content-based/content neutral
inquiry does not particularly matter, because both content and viewpoint
discrimination result in the same level of review. When the Court needs to, it can
reiterate that subject matter discrimination, like viewpoint discrimination, is
I. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) ("Our precedents... apply the most
exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because
of its content.").
2. Id. at 641 ("[T]he First Amendment, subject only to narrow and well-understood exceptions, does not
countenance governmental control over the content of messages expressed by private individuals."). But see
Burson v. Freedman, 504 U.S. 191, 200 (1992) ("While we readily acknowledge that a law rarely survives
Istrict] scrutiny, an examination of the evolution of election reform, both in this country and abroad,
demonstrates the necessity of restricted areas in or around polling places.").
3. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 59 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[Uinlike the viewpoint-discrimination concept, which is used to strike down government restrictions on
speech by particular speakers, the content neutrality principle is invoked when the government has imposed
restrictions on speech related to an entire subject area.").
4. Id. at 46 (Government "may reserve [a] forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise,
as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public
officials oppose the speaker's view.").
5. Courts and commentators have noted the inconsistency of these determinations. Sons of Confederate
Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 623 n. Il (4th Cir. 2002) ("As the
Ninth Circuit has noted, the 'coherence of the distinction between "content discrimination" and "viewpoint
discrimination" may be seen as "tenuous."'") (quoting Giebel v. Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1182, 1188 n. 10 (9th Cir.
2001)); see, e.g., Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1265 (1995)
("Whatever the ultimate merits of a First Amendment focus on content neutrality, the Court's doctrinal
elaboration of [it] has been haphazard, internally incoherent, and for these reasons inconsistent with any
possible principled concern for content neutrality.").
6. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 643 (distinguishing content-based from content neutral speech
restrictions by whether they "distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or
views expressed").
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problematic The primary problem with the merger in the content-based/content
neutral inquiry is that when the Court must make the content/viewpoint
determination, it has left itself no principled basis upon which to tell the different
types of government action apart." The result is fractured opinions, differently
stated tests, and holdings that can be criticized as outcome-driven.
Another problem is that, even when the Court agrees upon a test to make one
of the determinations, the Justices have trouble fitting the particular government
action within the rule. With respect to the content-based/content neutral inquiry,
the majority and dissenting Justices in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC9
agreed to inquire whether a cable television must-carry provision was justified by
the content of the regulated speech.' ° The Justices then disagreed on the
application of the facts to the law; the majority characterized Congress's desire to
preserve local stations as economic" while the dissenters characterized it as
aimed at preserving diversity in the television speech market."
With respect to the content/viewpoint inquiry, the Court has perceived
viewpoint discrimination where the government excludes religious speech from
more broad-based aid." In these instances, the Court defines viewpoint
discrimination as occurring when the government eliminates some perspectives
on a permitted subject matter of discussion. "4 In other instances, however, where
the government's access rules seem to result in the same type of favoritism, the
Court has not perceived viewpoint discrimination as occurring."
7. Burson, 504 U.S. at 197 ("This Court has held that the First Amendment's hostility to content-based
regulation extends not only to a restriction on a particular viewpoint, but also to a prohibition of public
discussion of an entire topic.").
8. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995) ("[T]he distinction
[between content and viewpoint discrimination] is not a precise one.").
9. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
10. Id. at 645 (looking beyond the face of the statute to whether "its manifest purpose is to regulate
speech because of the message it conveys"); id. at 676 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("I agree with the Court that some speaker-based restrictions-those genuinely justified without reference to
content-need not be subject to strict scrutiny.").
11. Id. at 646 ("Congress' [sic] overriding objective in enacting must-carry was not to favor
programming of a particular subject matter, viewpoint, or format, but rather to preserve access to free television
programming for the [forty] percent of Americans without cable.").
12. Id. at 677 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Preferences for diversity of
viewpoints, for localism, for educational programming, and for news and public affairs all make reference to
content.").
13. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001) (school's exclusion of Christian
club from meeting after hours at school was viewpoint discrimination); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819, 832
(university's exclusion of religious publication from funding was viewpoint based); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393 (1993) (school district's exclusion of religious group from
use of facilities was viewpoint based); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981) (university's exclusion of
religious group from use of school facilities was viewpoint based).
14. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 ("The prohibited perspective, not the general subject matter, resulted
in the [challenged government action], for the subjects discussed were otherwise within the approved category
of publications.").
15. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 682-83 (1998) (exclusion of independent
candidate from political debate was based on lack of popular support, not on "objections or opposition to his
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The resulting doctrine is confused and can appear outcome-driven. 16 It neither
corresponds well with free speech values, nor provides guidance to the lower
courts that must struggle to make the crucial doctrinal determinations.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE CRUCIAL DETERMINATIONS
The content-based/content neutral distinction is crucial in determining the
suspicion with which the Court will view a speech restriction. The entire class of
content-based restrictions-whether or not they also discriminate according to
viewpoint-receive strict scrutiny. 1 Content neutral speech restrictions receive
an intermediate level of review. 8
That the broad category of content-based speech restrictions identifies a more
constitutionally dangerous category of government actions than the category of
content neutral speech restrictions is not entirely clear.'9 Because they apply to a
subject matter or mode of speaking, content-based laws do not skew public
debate in an explicitly message-sensitive way, which is the primary free speech
clause danger. 2° They limit the absolute volume of speech available, but so do
content neutral speech restrictions.2 ' Sometimes content-based government actions
views"); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983) (granting access to union
representing school employees and denying it to rival union "is more accurate[ly] ... characterize[d] ... as
based on the status of the respective unions rather than their views.").
16. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 741 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[A] speech regulation directed
against the opponents of abortion ... enjoys the benefit of the 'ad hoc nullification machine' that the Court has
set in motion to push aside whatever doctrines of constitutional law stand in the way of that highly favored
practice.").
17. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("Content-based regulations are presumptively
invalid."); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 n.6 (1980) ("It is, of course, no answer to assert that the Illinois
statute does not discriminate on the basis of the speaker's viewpoint, but only on the basis of the subject matter
of his message. 'The First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on
particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic."'); Rosenberger, 515 U.S.
at 828 ("It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the
message it conveys."); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980)
("The First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular
viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.").
18. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) ("[Rlegulations that are unrelated to the
content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny .. ") (citation omitted).
19. Compare Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND.
L. REV. 265, 285 (1981) ("If the [F]irst [A]mendment is in fact designed in theory to protect discussion over a
wide area, a subject matter restriction is no more justifiable than a viewpoint restriction."), with Martin H.
Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 113 (1981) (content
distinction is "theoretically questionable").
20. Hill, 530 U.S. at 723 ("Regulation of the subject matter of messages, though not as obnoxious as
viewpoint-based regulation, is also an objectionable form of content-based regulation."); Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc., 512 U.S. at 641 ("Government action that stifles speech on account of its message ... contravenes th[e]
essential right [of self-determination that lies '[a]t the heart of the First Amendment']."); Rosenberger, 515 U.S.
at 829 ("When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject,
the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.").
21. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 54 n.35 (1987)
(pointing out that content neutral restrictions may in fact limit more speech than content discriminatory
restrictions).
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can hide viewpoint discriminatory motivation12 or come with strong viewpoint
discriminatory effects.2 The same is true, however, of content neutral laws.2
4
The best explanation for the centrality of the content-based/content neutral
distinction to free speech doctrine is a combination of the greater viewpoint
discrimination dangers posed by content discrimination2 1 plus the political
process check that content neutrality provides." To the extent that content-based
restrictions are more likely than content neutral restrictions to pose viewpoint
disciimination dangers, the distinction identifies the animating principle of the
free speech clause: the government may not favor or disfavor particular messages
21in the private marketplace of ideas. When it does so, it unconstitutionally skews
private discussion.2 This governmental skewing adversely impacts all of the
22. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 189, 241 (1983) (content discriminatory regulations are more likely than content neutral regulations "to be
the product of improper motivation.").
23. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 431 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) ("[A]
regulation that on its face regulates speech by subject matter may in some instances effectively suppress
particular viewpoints....") (citing Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530,
546-47 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, J.,
concurring) (statute that generally prohibits picketing, except that which is labor-related, denies "use of the
streets [for the expression of] views against racial discrimination"); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41, 56 n.1 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[R]estrictions [on sexually explicit speech] ... have a
potent viewpoint-differential impact" suppressing messages "in favor of more relaxed sexual mores.") (quoting
Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter
Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 111-112 (1978)); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 777 (1978)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (decision of Court to allow FCC to sanction station for broadcast of dirty words is
"another of the dominant culture's inevitable efforts to force those groups who do not share its mores to
conform to its way of thinking, acting, and speaking.").
24. Hill, 530 U.S. at 767 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("We would close our eyes to reality were we to
deny that 'oral protest, education, or counseling' outside the entrances to medical facilities concern a narrow
range of topics-indeed, one topic in particular."); see Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagement for Cultural
Wars: Regulating Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and Protected Expression in Anti-Abortion Protests, 29 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 553, 596 (1996) ("Standing alone, carefully crafted but facially neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions may be almost as effective as narrowly stated content-discriminatory laws in unfairly influencing
public debate.").
25. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642 ("[Rlegulations that are unrelated to the content of speech
are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny ... because in most cases they pose a less substantial risk of
excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue.").
26. Id. at 676 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Laws that treat all speakers
equally are relatively poor tools for controlling public debate, and their very generality creates a substantial
political check that prevents them from being unduly burdensome.").
27. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 59 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("The content neutrality principle can be seen as an outgrowth of the core First Amendment prohibition against
viewpoint discrimination.").
28. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 430 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) ("[Viewpoint discrimination] requires
particular scrutiny, in part because such regulation often indicates a legislative effort to skew public debate on
an issue.") (citing Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 63 (1970)); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 894 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he prohibition on viewpoint discrimination serves
that important purpose of the Free Speech Clause, which is to bar the government from skewing public
debate."); Cox, 379 U.S. at 581 (Black, J., concurring)
[B]y specifically permitting picketing for the publication of labor union views [and not
political views, such as protests against racial discrimination], Louisiana is attempting to pick
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values that underpin the free speech guarantee. It thwarts the free search for
truth 9 and political self-determination3 ° by the polity; it undermines the autonomy
interests of both speakers and listeners;" and it fails to promote tolerance," as
most viewpoint discriminatory government actions result from the majority's
hostility toward a minority point of view.
The political process check occurs because of the broad applicability of
content neutral restrictions to all topics. First, government bodies are less likely
to enact content neutral speech restrictions because of the broad burdens they
impose.33 Content-based restrictions, after all, can be crafted to preserve the
speech rights of particularly strong constituencies. Second, that content neutral
speech restrictions apply broadly also makes their nonspeech justifications more
worthy of respect when the government chooses to enact them.35 It is thus the
combination of justifications-the suspicions of viewpoint discrimination plus
the political process check-that best explains the centrality of the content-
based/content neutral determination to free speech doctrine.
It is not necessary to search for the justification for the distinction between
viewpoint discriminatory and all other speech restrictions. Viewpoint discrimination
by the government is the primary free speech clause danger." The government
and choose among the views it is willing to have discussed on its streets. It thus is trying to
prescribe by law what matters of public interest people whom it allows to assemble on its
streets may and may not discuss. This seems to me to be censorship in a most odious form,
unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id.
29. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market .... ).
30. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 534 (1980) ("Freedom of
speech is 'indispensible to the discovery and spread of political truth... " (quoting Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 311 (1974)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("For speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of
self-government." (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964))).
31. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 447 U.S. at 534 n.2 ("Freedom of speech also protects the individual's
interest in self-expression.").
32. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN
AMERICA 107 (1986) (asserting that a purpose of free speech is to develop individuals' capacities for tolerance
and self-restraint).
33. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 676 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring part and
dissenting in part) ("Laws that treat all speakers equally are relatively poor tools for controlling public debate,
and their very generality creates a substantial political check that prevents them from being unduly
burdensome.").
34. Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (considering an ordinance that exempted labor
picketing from general picketing exclusion); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466 (1980) (rejecting state's
asserted interest in "providing special protection for labor protests.").
35. Brownstein, supra note 24, at 609 ("The broader coverage of the content-neutral law not only makes
it more difficult to enact, it also suggests that the legislature's evaluation of the costs and benefits that allegedly
justify the law's enactment are more worthy of respect.").
36. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) ("Viewpoint
discrimination is ... an egregious form of content discrimination."); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 785-86 (1978) ("Especially where.., the legislature's suppression of speech suggests an attempt to
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can almost never justify this type of speech restriction. By contrast, as noted
above, content-based speech restrictions do not necessarily pose the same
certainty or degree of free speech clause danger. While the danger they pose is
sufficient to group them with viewpoint-based speech restrictions, free speech
doctrine distinguishes content-based from viewpoint-based government assistance
to private speakers.
It is in evaluating the government's administration of a private speech
forum" that the content/viewpoint discrimination distinction is crucial. The
government need not spend funds or devote its property to assist private
speakers. 39 Because assistance to private speakers is valuable, and a potentially
revocable government choice, the rigorous rules that limit government influence
give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First
Amendment is plainly offended."); City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1976) ("To permit one side of a debatable public question to have a monopoly
in expressing its views ... is the antithesis of constitutional guarantees."); Consol. Edison Co. of N. Y., 447 U.S.
at 546 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("A regulation of speech that is motivated by nothing more than a desire to
curtail expression of a particular point of view on controversial issues of general interest is the purest example
of a 'law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."').
37. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998).
"The Court [has] identified three types of fora: the traditional public forum, the public forum
created by government designation, and the nonpublic forum." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802... (1985). Traditional public fora are defined by
the objective characteristics of the property, such as whether, "by long tradition or by
government fiat," the property has been "devoted to assembly and debate." [Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). The government can exclude
a speaker from a traditional public forum "only when the exclusion is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest."
Cornelius, [473 U.S. at 8001.
Designated public fora, in contrast, are created by purposeful governmental action.
"The government does not create a [designated] public forum by inaction or by permitting
limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional public forum for public
discourse." [Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 8021; accord, [Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.
v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678] (1992) (ISKCON) (designated public forum is "property that the
State has opened for expressive activity by all or part of the public"). Hence, "the Court has
looked to the policy and practice of the government to ascertain whether it intended to
designate a place not traditionally open to assembly and debate as a public forum." Cornelius,
473 U.S. at 802. If the government excludes a speaker who falls within the class to which a
designated public forum is made generally available, its action is subject to strict scrutiny.
[id.1; United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726-727 ... (1990) (plurality opinion of
O'Connor, J.).
Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677.
38. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30.
[I]n determining whether the State is acting to preserve the limits of the forum it has created
so that the exclusion of a class of speech is legitimate, we have observed a distinction
between, on the one hand, content discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves
the purposes of that limited forum, and, on the other hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is
presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum's
limitations.
Id.
39. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 680 ("[W]ith the exception of traditional public fora, the government retains the
choice of whether to designate its property as a forum for specified classes of speakers.").
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in the private speech market do not apply)n0 Rather, a balance of interests defines
the rules of government-created private speech forums. Because of the
government's legitimate interest in defining its own programs and effectively
carrying out nonspeech-promoting functions with its funds and property, it may
limit its assistance to private speakers according to the content of the assisted
speech so long as the limitation is reasonable.' It may not, however, discriminate
according to viewpoint.42 Even where the government's assistance makes private
speech possible, it may not engage in this highly dangerous activity.43 The
validity of the government's administration of a private speech forum thus
crucially hinges on the content/viewpoint determination. A content discriminatory
forum is almost certainly valid," whereas a viewpoint discriminatory forum,
equally as surely, is not.
45
III. LINE-DRAWING PROBLEMS
Although the content-based/content neutral and content/viewpoint
discrimination determinations are central to free speech doctrine, the Court has
experienced increasing difficulty in making them, and in making them
consistently. The Court has acknowledged that "[d]eciding whether a particular
regulation is content-based or content neutral is not always a simple task,"4 and
that the content/viewpoint distinction "is not a precise one." 47 Confusion is
evident at a number of different levels.
A. Mixed up Statements and Applications
The Court confuses the content-based/content neutral and the content/viewpoint
inquiries both when stating and applying them. The Court frequently describes the
40. Id. ("By recognizing the distinction [between forums where strict scrutiny governs the access and
rules and other forums where a lesser standard applies], we encourage the government to open its property to
some expressive activity in cases where, if faced with an all-or-nothing choice, it might not open the property at
all.").
41. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 ("[Where] [plublic property ... is not by tradition or designation a
forum for public communication ... the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or
otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because
public officials oppose the speaker's view.").
42. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (stating that in a private speech forum government may not
"discriminate against speech on the basis of its viewpoint").
43. Id. ("Once it has opened a limited forum ... the State must respect the lawful boundaries it has
itself set.").
44. Id. ("The necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was
created may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.").
45. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001) ("The State's power to restrict
speech [in a limited or nonpublic forum] ... is not without limits. The restriction must not discriminate against
speech on the basis of viewpoint .... ").
46. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
47. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
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content-based/content neutral inquiry as hinging on the presence of viewpoint
discrimination. 4 The Court's often repeated test for content neutrality is "whether
the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with
the message it conveys." 49 The Court frequently acknowledges, however, that the
content-based category extends to subject matter distinctions.' It has also found
content-based government actions that restrict categories of speech that do not
depend upon either subject matter or viewpoint, such as signs that bring their
targets into "public odium" or "disrepute,"'" nudity52 and indecency 3 restrictions,
and restrictions on the use of certain symbols 4 or words.55 These statements
render the scope of the "content" category ambiguous.
48. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 643 ("As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish
favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based."); id.
(citing and contrasting Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804
(1984) ("ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public property 'is neutral-indeed it is silent-concerning
any speaker's point of view"')); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 59 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The content-neutrality cases frequently refer to the prohibition against viewpoint
discrimination and both concepts have their roots in the First Amendment's bar against censorship."); Consol.
Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) ("[W]hen regulation is based on
the content of speech, governmental action must be scrutinized ... carefully to ensure that communication has
not been prohibited 'merely because public officials disapprove the speaker's views."' (quoting Niemotko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result))); City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1986) (determining that an ordinance that zones movie theaters according to
their adult content "does not contravene the fundamental principle that underlies our concern about 'content-
based' speech regulations: that 'government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds
acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views,"').
49. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989)); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984); see Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512
U.S. at 643 ("As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on
the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based.").
50. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000) ("Regulation of ... subject matter of messages, though
not as obnoxious as viewpoint-based regulation, is also an objectionable form of content-based regulation.");
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 447 U.S. at 538; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 ("Viewpoint discrimination is thus
an egregious form of content discrimination.").
51. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 316 (1988).
52. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211 (1975) (stating that an ordinance prohibiting
certain types of nudity in films "discriminates among movies solely on the basis of content.").
53. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000) ("The speech in question
[("sexually explicit adult programming or other programming that is indecent")] is defined by its content; and
the statute which seeks to restrict it is content based."); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744 (1978) ("It is
equally clear that the Commission's objections to the [indecent] broadcast were based in part on its content.");
see Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572-73 (1998) (addressing provision that required
National Endowment for the Arts to consider decency in awarding grants and finding it not to be
unconstitutionally viewpoint-based).
54. Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1549-50 (2003) (determining that prohibition of cross-burning
with intent to intimidate is content-based but justified); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317-18 (1990)
(determining that a statute that prohibits knowing flag desecration is content-based); Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405, 414 nn.8, 9 (1974) (stating that statute that declares "nothing may be affixed to or superimposed on a
United States flag" is content-based).
55. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (stating that forbidding particular words "run[s] a
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.").
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Also ambiguous is what evidence demonstrates that a government action is
content-based. Here, too, the Court's statements and applications vary. A
statement used often by the Court to describe the content-based/content neutral
inquiry is that a speech restriction is content neutral "so long as it is 'justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech.' 5 6 The Court has
explained that "[t]he purpose, or justification, of a regulation will often be
evident on its face. 57 It has also said, however, that demonstrating an "illicit
legislative intent" is not "necessary ... in all cases."" And, "the mere assertion of
a content-neutral purpose [will not] be enough to save a law which, on its face,
discriminates based on content., 59 These statements suggest that both the lines
drawn on the face of a government action and its underlying justifications are
relevant to determining its content neutrality, without clarifying their relative
significance when the two conflict.
One variation of the conflict is where the lines on the face of the government
action are content neutral, but the government purpose may be content-based.
The Court has emphasized that mere impact on a particular content of speech
does not make the content neutral action content-based; ° neither does the fact
that some lawmakers may have been motivated by the conduct of particular
speakers to take the action.61 The Court has recently stated that, even were "[a]
statute making it a misdemeanor to sit at a lunch counter for an hour without
ordering any food ... enacted by a racist legislature that hated civil rights
protesters," the statute would be content neutral. 62 The circumstances of its
enactment might then bear upon the legitimacy of the government's asserted
interest in the intermediate scrutiny that applies to content neutral government
61
actions.
56. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)) (emphasis added); see also Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981) (quoting Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
57. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
58. Id. (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 177
(1991)).
59. Id. at 642-43.
60. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 ("A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is
deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.").
61. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 724 (2000) ("A statute prohibiting solicitation in airports that was
motivated by the aggressive approaches of Hare Krishnas does not become content based solely because its
application is confined to airports-'the specific locations where [that] discourse occurs."') (alteration in
original); id. at 724-25 ("The antipicketing ordinance upheld in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 ... (1988)....
was obviously enacted in response to the activities of antiabortion protesters who wanted to protest at the home
of a particular doctor to persuade him and others that they viewed his practice of performing abortions to be
murder."); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("It is a familiar principle of constitutional law
that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative
motive.").
62. Hill, 530 U.S. at 724.
63. Id.
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Although the lunch counter example is a strong one, the Court has also stated
there is a limit to the protection that a facially neutral government action may
provide. Specifically, "facially neutral and valid justifications" for a government
action "cannot save an exclusion that is in fact based on the desire to suppress a
particular point of view."' In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc., the Court noted that the excluded speakers had introduced some
evidence "to cast doubt on [the] genuineness" of the government's facially neutral
grounds for distinguishing among groups to participate in its fundraising
campaign, and directed the lower court to resolve the question of government
motivation. So, in this variation, where the lines drawn on the face of the
government action are content neutral, the facial determination is almost always,
but not certainly, dispositive.
The other variation exists where lines on the face of the government action
are content-based, but the government asserts content neutral purposes for its
action. Here, the Court has introduced the "secondary effects" doctrine as a
means by which the government may, in certain instances, sanitize a facially
content-based action. In a line of cases dealing with sexual speech, the Court has
focused on the definition of content neutral speech regulations as 'Justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech" 66 to look beyond the
content discriminatory face of a speech restriction and characterize its
justification as content neutral. In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., the
city enacted an ordinance prohibiting adult theaters in specified areas. The Court
found that the ordinance was "aimed not at the content of the films shown at
'adult motion picture theatres,' but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters
on the surrounding community. '6 Others have criticized the "secondary effects"
test as hiding the viewpoint discrimination that the "on the face" content
discrimination test is designed to detect.69 The Court has since extended the
"secondary effects" rationale beyond zoning restrictions to absolute restrictions
on nude dancing.70 It has thus far refused to apply the secondary effects rationale
beyond the context of sexual speech.7' In other instances, however, the Court has
64. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 812 (1985).
65. Id.
66. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (quoting Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
67. Id. at41.
68. Id. at 47.
69. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 336 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Tihe inherently ill-defined
nature of the Renton analysis ... exacerbates the risk that many laws designed to suppress disfavored speech
will go undetected.").
70. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296-97 (2000) (determining that public nudity ordinance
that bars nude dancing, requiring dancers to wear pasties and G-strings, is content neutral because it is aimed at
secondary effects of nude dancing establishments).
71. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321 (concluding that international law obligation to shield diplomats from speech
that offends their dignity is not justified by secondary effects because the "justification focuses only on the
content of the speech and the direct impact that speech has on its listeners."); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
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implied that nonspeech justifications can render a government action content
neutral even though application of the restriction depends, in part, on the content
of the speech." Lower courts have explicitly used the secondary effects language
outside the context of sexual speech." So, it is unclear the extent to which the
"justified without reference to the content of regulated speech" test can immunize
a facially content discriminatory government action.
With respect to the content/viewpoint determination, the Court's statements
and applications have been similarly mixed. In Boos v. Barry, the Court
examined a statute that prohibited displays close to foreign embassies "designed
... to... bring [the foreign government, its agencies or officials] into public
odium... or... disrepute."74 The Court found the restriction to be content, but
not viewpoint, based." Although the statute allowed some viewpoints, but not
others, to be expressed about the same subject matter, the Court found it
viewpoint neutral because it "determine[d] which viewpoint [was] acceptable in a
neutral fashion by looking to the policies of foreign governments."76 The
restriction was content-based because it prohibited "an entire category of
speech-signs or displays critical of foreign governments . .."" The Court has
also found exclusions of "political" speech from a private speech forum to be
viewpoint neutral.78
By contrast to the category of "critical" or "political" speech, the Court has
been quick to perceive viewpoint discrimination when the government excises
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 430 (1993) ("In contrast to the speech at issue in Renton, there are no secondary
effects attributable to ... newsracks [containing commercial handbills, which are restricted] that distinguish
them from the newsracks Cincinnati permits to remain on its sidewalks.").
72. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719-20 (2000) (stating that Colorado statute prohibiting unconsented-to
approach for purposes of protest, education or counseling is content neutral in part because "the State's interests in
protecting access and privacy, and providing the police with clear guidelines, are unrelated to the content of the
demonstrators' speech."); id. at 746-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court makes too much of [the purpose inquiry
in determining content neutrality].... Our very first use of the 'justified by reference to content' language made
clear that it is a prohibition in addition to, rather than in place of, the prohibition of facially content-based
restrictions."); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 736 (1990) (concluding that prohibition of solicitation on
sidewalk outside post office "[cilearly ... does not discriminate on the basis of content or viewpoint."); id. at 753
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he regulation is not content neutral; indeed, it is tied explicitly to the content of
speech.... [A speaker's] punishment depends entirely on what he says.").
73. McGuire v. Reilly, 260 F.3d 36, 44 (lst Cir. 2001) (stating that the legislature was legitimately
aiming at "the deleterious secondary effects of anti-abortion protests" when it prohibited certain speech around
abortion clinics so the fact that it targeted speech around abortion clinics does not make the statute content-
based).
74. Boos, 485 U.S. at 316 (quoting D.C. Code § 22-1115 (1981)).
75. Id. at 319.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976) (considering a regulation that prohibits political speeches
on military base); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 812 (1985) (involving the
exclusion of political activity or advocacy groups from fundraising drive); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,
418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (upholding the exclusion of political messages from transit system advertising).
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religious speech from a private speech forum.79 In this context, the Court's
reasoning is that the government engages in viewpoint discrimination when it
excludes a viewpoint or set of viewpoints on an otherwise includable subject.' ° In
these cases, the Court has rejected the government's interest in avoiding an
Establishment Clause violation as a neutral justification for the exclusion .,
Sometimes, in describing the content/viewpoint line that determines the
validity of private speech forum and government subsidy boundaries, the Court and
individual Justices implicitly or explicitly change the viewpoint discrimination test
to require particularly egregious government efforts to suppress a particular
viewpoint to invalidate the access limitation." In evaluating a National
Endowment for the Arts consideration that funded art be "decent," the Court
noted that, while the provision was susceptible to viewpoint discriminatory
application, it did not constitute the type of "directed viewpoint discrimination
that would prompt th[e] Court to invalidate a statute on its face."83 The Court
emphasized that "invidious viewpoint discrimination" 8 occurs when the government
"aim[s] at the suppression of dangerous ideas, ''5 or "manipulate[s]" a subsidy "to
have a coercive effect"" or imposes "a disproportionate burden calculated to
drive 'certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.'" 8 7 Applying these tests,
the Court refused to label the funding consideration as certainly viewpoint
discriminatory. 8
Justice Scalia labeled the provision viewpoint discriminatory, 9 but, relying
on the fact that the government action was a subsidy rather than a speech
restriction, which calls for a different test, opined that the funding condition was
79. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
80. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 109 ("Like the church in Lamb's Chapel, the Club seeks to address a
subject otherwise permitted under the rule, the teaching of morals and character, from a religious standpoint.").
81. Id. at 113 ("We rejected Establishment Clause defenses similar to Milford's in two previous free
speech cases, Lamb's Chapel and Widmar.").
82. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 ("[Tlhe government violates the First Amendment when it denies access
to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject.").
83. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 583 (1998).
84. Id. at 587.
85, Id. (quoting Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983)).
86. Id. (quoting Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 237 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
87. Id. (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
116 (1991)).
88. Id. ("Unless and until [the funding restriction] is applied in a manner that raises concern about the
suppression of disfavored viewpoints... we uphold the constitutionality of the provision.").
89. Id. at 593 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[The funding condition] unquestionably constitutes viewpoint
discrimination."). But see id. at 593 n.l (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that any uncertainty hinges on whether
the condition is content or viewpoint discriminatory, declining to resolve the issue, and, because it does not
matter to his resolution, "assum[ing] the worst.").
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constitutional despite the reality that it was viewpoint-based. Justice Souter,
relying on the generally applicable viewpoint discrimination test that looks to the
government's viewpoint conscious purpose,9 labeled the condition "quintessentially
viewpoint based"92 and unconstitutional for this reason.9'
A similar difference in characterization that relates to the form of the
government action appears in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez.94 In that case,
the majority held that Legal Services Corporation funding that prohibited
government attorneys from challenging existing welfare laws was viewpoint
discriminatory because it "define[d] the scope of the litigation it funds to exclude
certain vital theories and ideas."95 Justice Scalia, however, found the provision
not to "discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, since it funds neither challenges to
nor defenses of existing welfare law."' Crucial to him was that the act at issue
was "a federal subsidy program, not a federal regulatory program," and so could
not "directly restrict speech." '
B. The Relevance of Neutral Distinctions with Discriminatory Effects
In both the content-based/content neutral and the content/viewpoint inquiries,
the Court and individual Justices have noticed the discriminatory effects of a
number of content neutral distinctions that determine the application of a government
action. It remains unclear where these effects enter into the constitutional analysis, if
at all, and what weight they should have when they enter.
1. Location Restrictions
It has been the general rule that a location restriction on speech is, by itself,
content neutral. 98 It has also been the rule that where a location restriction is
90. Id. at 596 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("It is preposterous to equate the denial of taxpayer subsidy with
measures 'aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas."') (quoting Regan, 461 U.S. at 550).
91. Id. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The government's purpose is the controlling consideration.")
(quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
92. Id. at 605 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Because 'the normal definition of "indecent" ... refers to
nonconformance with accepted standards of morality,' . . . restrictions turning on decency, especially those
couched in terms of 'general standards of decency,' are quintessentially viewpoint based...") (quoting FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740 (1978)).
93. Id. at 610 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[A] statute that mandates the consideration of viewpoint is quite
obviously unconstitutional.").
94. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
95. Id. at 548.
96. Id. at 553 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 552 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 323 (2002) (referring to a "content-neutral time, place and
manner restriction[]").
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combined with a content-based distinction, the government action is content-
based. 99 Neither of these rules stands now firm and unchallenged.
A location restriction can have strong content or viewpoint discriminatory
effects. For example, a rule restricting speech outside a medical facility
disproportionately impacts abortion protesters. That does not, however, render the
rule content-based.'0' Justice Kennedy has recently challenged this assumption,
arguing that the locational restriction combined with its obvious effect should
change the constitutional analysis at the critical content-based/content neutral
juncture.'0' The majority disagreed, emphasizing the established rule that the
content neutral face of a government action, rather than its content- or viewpoint-
based motivation, is controlling.'O The majority found the location restriction to
enhance the constitutionality of the government action by limiting its impact.0 3
Justice Scalia found it to cut the other way: "A proper regard for the 'place'
involved in this case should result in, if anything, a commitment by this Court to
adhere to and rigorously enforce our speech-protective standards."'O'
2. Speaker Restrictions
Sometimes the Court has indicated that speech restrictions that distinguish
among speakers are highly dangerous °5 Other times, the Court has emphasized
that distinctions based on speaker status are not necessarily either content-1 or
99. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1988) (determining that the restriction on displaying signs
critical of foreign governments around embassies is content-based); Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 95 (1972) (stating that a city ordinance prohibiting picketing around school, except for labor picketing, is
content-based).
100. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 374 n.6 (1997) ("[Tlhe injunction was
issued not because of the content of [the protesters'] expression .... but because of their prior unlawful
conduct.") (alteration in original) (quoting Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764 n.2 (1994)).
101. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 767 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("By confining the law's
application to the specific locations where the prohibited discourse occurs, the State has made a content-based
determination.... Clever content-based restrictions are no less offensive than censoring on the basis of
content.").
102. Id. at 724.
A statute prohibiting solicitation in airports that was motivated by the aggressive approaches
of Hare Krishnas does not become content-based solely because its application is confined to
airports.... A statute making it a misdemeanor to sit at a lunch counter for an hour without
ordering any food would also not be "content based" even if it were enacted by a racist
legislature that hated civil rights protesters ....
103. Id. at 723 ("The Colorado statute's regulation of the location of protests, education, and
counseling ... simply establishes a minor place restriction on an extremely broad category of communications
with unwilling listeners.").
104. Id. at 763 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000) ("Laws designed or intended to
suppress or restrict the expression of specific speakers contradict basic First Amendment principles.").
106. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 657-58 (1994) ("[T]he view that all regulations
distinguishing between speakers warrant strict scrutiny ... is mistaken .... [L]aws favoring some speakers over
others demand strict scrutiny when the legislature's speaker preference reflects a content preference.").
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viewpoint-'O based. In a number of circumstances, it has characterized such
distinctions as neutral, even when the speaker status correlated to the content or
viewpoint of speech.
For example, in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the majority of the
Court concluded that the must-carry provisions it was reviewing were "not
designed to favor or disadvantage speech of any particular content."'"' 8 Instead,
they were economically based, specifically "to protect broadcast television from
what Congress determined to be unfair competition by cable systems. ' ' The
dissenters, however, noted that the reason Congress wanted broadcasters to
remain economically viable was related to the content of their speech. " °
In Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, the Court
characterized a rule barring a rival union's access to the school mail system as
based on speaker identity-only the union with the official role of representing
the school's teachers gained access. " ' According to the Court, "We believe it is
more accurate to characterize the access policy as based on the status of the
respective unions rather than their views.""' In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., the Court found that a line between direct
service organizations and those that engaged in political advocacy was not, on its
face, viewpoint-based."' In Regan v. Taxation With Representation of
Washington, the Court found a tax benefit for lobbying by veterans' groups to be
based on speaker identity rather than viewpoint. 114
With some types of speech restrictions, the Court equates the government's
purpose to restrict speech because of its effect on others with content
discrimination. The government cannot silence speakers because their speech
107. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 682 (1998) (stating that speaker status
distinction is not viewpoint-based); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983)
(same).
108. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 652.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 678 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The interest in ensuring access
to a multiplicity of diverse and antagonistic sources of information, no matter how praiseworthy, is directly tied
to the content of what the speakers will likely say.").
111. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 50-51.
The differential access provided [the two unions] is reasonable because it is wholly consistent
with the District's legitimate interest in "preserv[ing] the property ... for the use to which it
is lawfully dedicated.".. . [The rival union] does not have any official responsibility in
connection with the School District and need not be entitled to the same rights of access to
school mailboxes.
Id. (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1981)).
112. Id. at49.
113. 473 U.S. 788, 812-13 (1985) (accepting exclusion of advocacy groups as "facially neutral and
valid justifications for exclusion from the nonpublic forum," although remanding to the lower court to
determine "whether the exclusion of respondents was impermissibly motivated by a desire to suppress a
particular point of view.").
114. 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834
(1995) ("Regan relied on a distinction based on preferential treatment of certain speakers-veterans'
organizations-and not a distinction based on the content or messages of those groups' speech.").
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will offend listeners or otherwise render their audience "hostile."" 5 The Court has
repeatedly cautioned that "when the government, acting as censor, undertakes
selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they
are more offensive than others, the First Amendment strictly limits its power."
' 16
In a recent context, however, the Court accepted a popularity distinction as
neutral. In Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes,"' the Court
characterized a public television station's decision to exclude an independent
candidate from a debate as based on his status rather than his views. According to
the Court, "It is, in short, beyond dispute that Forbes was excluded not because
of his viewpoint but because he had generated no appreciable public interest."" 8
Despite the fact that public interest must logically be based, at least in part,"9 on a
candidate's views, the Court characterized the "lack of support" ground for
exclusion as "objective" rather than viewpoint-based.120
3. Type of Activity Restrictions
The Court has found some types of activity restrictions to be content-based.
In FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, it found a ban on
"editorializing" by government funded television stations to be "defined solely
on the basis of the content of the suppressed speech."'' To determine whether the
ban applied, it was crucial to examine the content of a station's communication.'
The Court has found a number of other types of activity restrictions to be
content neutral. These have, for a long time, included picketing and leafleting.,"
115. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 11, 117-18 (1969) (stating that the government cannot
arrest protesters as means of preventing hostile audience reaction); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965)
(same); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963) (same).
116. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); id. at 210-11 ("[Tihe burden
normally falls upon the [offended] viewer to 'avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by
averting [his] eyes."' (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971))); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322
(1988) (noting the "longstanding refusal to [punish speech] because the speech in question may have an adverse
emotional impact on the audience." (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)))
(alteration in original).
117. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
118. Id.at682.
119. But see id. at 683 ("A candidate with unconventional views might well enjoy broad support by
virtue of a compelling personality or an exemplary campaign organization. By the same token, a candidate with
a traditional platform might enjoy little support due to an inept campaign or any number of other reasons.").
120. Id.
121. 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984).
122. Id. ("[I]n order to determine whether a particular statement by station management constitutes an
'editorial' proscribed by [the statute], enforcement authorities must necessarily examine the content of the
message that is conveyed to determine whether the views expressed concern 'controversial issues of public
importance."' (quoting In re Accuracy in Media, Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d 297, 302 (1973))).
123. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 722 n.30 (2000). ("In United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 ...
(1983), after examining a federal statute that was '[iinterpreted and applied' as 'prohibit[ing] picketing and
leafleting, but not other expressive conduct' within the Supreme Court building and grounds, we concluded that
'it is clear that the prohibition is facially content-neutral.' Id. at 18 1, n. 10.") (alteration in original).
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They have been extended to include lobbying,"A soliciting,' demonstrating,"'
and most recently, approaching another "for the purpose of ... engaging in oral
protest, education, or counseling."'27 The rationale for treating all of these types
of activity restrictions as content neutral is that their application does not depend
upon either the viewpoint or subject matter of the communication. Some of them,
however, require examination of the communication, and even understanding of
its meaning, to determine whether the speech restriction applies.
Recently, members of the Court have differed sharply as to whether this type
of speech restriction should be analyzed as content neutral. In Hill v. Colorado,
the majority held that a restriction on approaching another "for the purpose of...
engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling"'' 28 is content neutral. Crucial to
the majority was that the restriction discriminated neither upon the basis of
viewpoint or subject matter,129 but rather "establishe[d] a minor place restriction
on an extremely broad category of communications with unwilling listeners."'
Although the Court acknowledged that sometimes it might be necessary to
examine the content of a speaker's communication to determine whether it is
covered by the restriction, it reasoned that "the kind of cursory examination that
might be required" to make the determination, which was similar to that required
to distinguish other content neutral types of speech, did not render the restriction
content-based. 3' Justice Souter, joined by Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg and
Breyer, emphasized that the Hill statute merely regulated the "manner of
speaking" in a "perfectly valid" way.112
Other Justices viewed the type of speech restriction as content-based and
invalid. According to Justice Scalia, the Court "ha[s] never held that the universe
of content-based regulations is limited to those [that discriminate according to
subject matter or viewpoint]."'33 He hypothesized about a theoretical restriction
124. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983) (stating that veterans'
groups that qualify under the statute "are entitled to receive tax-deductible contributions regardless of the
content of any speech they may use, including lobbying.").
125. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 736 (1990) (arguing that solicitation is "a content-neutral
ground"); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 653 (1981) (discussing
appropriate limitations on soliciting at fairgrounds).
126. Hill, 530 U.S. at 722 n.30 ("[O]ur decisions in Schenck and Madsen both upheld injunctions that
also prohibited 'demonstrating."').
127. Id. at 707.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 722 (explaining the holding in Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 452, 462 (1980), as hinging on "the
fact that the statute placed a prohibition on discussion of particular topics"); id. at 736 (Souter, J., concurring)
("Unless regulation limited to the details of a speaker's delivery results in removing a subject or viewpoint from
effective discourse .... a reasonable restriction intended to affect only the time, place, or manner of speaking is
perfectly valid.").
130. Id. at 723 (noting that the provision "applies equally to used car salesmen, animal rights activists,
fundraisers, environmentalists, and missionaries").
131. Id. at 722.
132. Id. at 736 (Sourer, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 742-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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on the writing or recitation of poetry and opined that "[s]urely this Court would
consider such [a] regulation[] to be 'content based."" 14 According to Justice
Scalia, the restriction at issue posed the danger of "invidious... thought control"
that justified treating it as content-based. 1'
Justice Kennedy agreed, emphasizing that, unlike restrictions on picketing or
leafleting, "the State must review content to determine whether a person has
engaged in criminal 'protest, education or counseling. ,6 Like Justice Scalia, he
found free speech danger that justified content-based review even though the
restriction on its face did not limit viewpoints or subject matters. According to
Justice Kennedy, "the [subject matter] evenhandedness the Court finds so
satisfying ... is but a disguise for a glaring First Amendment violation"; 137 casual
speech is permissible but controversial speech, particularly about the morality of
abortion, is not.'38
The debate among the Justices in Hill echoes an earlier debate, in United
States v. Kokinda, in which the Court upheld as content neutral the United States
Postal Service's ban on "solicitation" in front of its buildings.'39 The plurality
emphasized the disruptive effects of solicitation'40 and the absence of evidence to
suggest that the Postal Service intended to discourage or advance a point of
view.' 41 Justice Kennedy concurred, labeling the restriction a reasonable "time,
place, and manner restriction[]" and noting that "[t]he regulation.., expressly
permits the respondents and all others to engage in political speech on topics of
their choice."44 Despite its subject matter and viewpoint neutrality, four Justices
in dissent found the solicitation exclusion to be content-based, reasoning that
"[a]ny restriction on speech, the application of which turns on the substance of
the speech, is content based no matter what the Government's interest may be."'1
43
134. Id. at 743 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 743-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753,
794 (1994)) ("A restriction that operates only on speech that communicates a message of protest, education, or
counseling presents exactly this risk. When applied, as it is here, at the entrance to medical facilities, it is a
means of impeding speech against abortion.").
136. Id. at 766 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 768 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
To say that one citizen can approach another to ask the time or the weather forecast or the
directions to Main Street but not to initiate discussion on one of the most basic moral and
political issues in all of contemporary discourse, a question touching profound ideas in
philosophy and theology, is an astonishing view of the First Amendment. For the majority to
examine the statute under rules applicable to content-neutral regulations is an affront to First
Amendment teachings.
Id.
139. 497 U.S. 720, 736-37 (1990).
140. Id. at 733-34 (noting that solicitation "impedes the normal flow of traffic," "requires action by
those who would respond," and "is more intrusive and intimidating than an encounter with a person giving out
information.").
141. Id.at736.
142. Id. at 738-39.
143. Id. at 754 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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In other instances as well, the Court has found the content category to extend
beyond subject matter or viewpoint discrimination. For example, in Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, the Court labeled the City's concern with sound mix and
amplification content neutral. 44 It cautioned, however, that "[a]ny governmental
attempt to serve purely esthetic goals by imposing subjective standards of
acceptable sound mix on performers would raise serious First Amendment
concerns."'' 45 In a number of circumstances, the Court has also recognized that
prohibitions of nudity, sexual explicitness or indecency in speech, although not
identified exclusively with a particular subject matter or viewpoint, are content-
based. 4
C. Determining the Scope of Application of the Government Action
Whether a government action is content-based or content neutral, or content-
as opposed to viewpoint-based, often depends upon the way that the Court or
individual Justices view the scope of its application. In Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC, the majority of the Court looked at the government action
from the perspective of the burdened speaker, asking whether the must-carry
rule's application varied according to a particular speaker's choice of content.141
The dissenters, however, focused more broadly on whether Congress's selection
of particular types of speakers for benefits and burdens depended upon the likely
content of their expression.'48
The Court has struck down flag desecration statutes as content-based. 49 The
Court reasoned that the government's purpose for preventing desecration, while
allowing respectful disposal of worn or soiled flags, was to "suppress[]
144. 49 U.S. 781,792 (1989).
145. Id. at 793.
146. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000) (stating that the prohibition
of "sexually explicit adult programming or other programming that is indecent" "is defined by its content; and
the statute which seeks to restrict it is content based"); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) ("The
question in this case is whether a broadcast of patently offensive words dealing with sex and excretion may be
regulated because of its content."); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211 (1975) ("The
Jacksonville ordinance [which makes it a nuisance for a movie theater to exhibit scenes of nudity visible from
public places] discriminates among movies solely on the basis of content."). But see City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1986) (finding adult theater zoning ordinance content neutral because
justified by nonspeech secondary effects); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 279 (2000) (concluding
that secondary effects purpose renders public nudity prohibition that limits nude dancing content neutral).
147. 512 U.S. 622, 644 (1994) ("Nothing in the Act imposes a restriction, penalty, or burden by reason
of the views, programs, or stations the cable operator has selected or will select.").
148. Id. at 679 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that Congress's
reasons for preferring broadcasters over cable programmers "rest in part on the content of broadcasters'
speech.").
149. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412-15
(1989); see Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414-15 (1974) (striking down statute as applied prohibiting
affixing anything to the flag).
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expression out of concern for its likely communicative impact."' ° The statutes
were therefore content-based.15' Dissenters disagreed, arguing that "[t]he
Government's legitimate interest in preserving the symbolic value of the flag is
... essentially the same regardless of which of many different ideas may have
motivated a particular act of flag burning."'52 According to the dissenters, flag
burning is a method of conveying a range of different ideas, and does not
represent a particular viewpoint or subject matter itself.'53
A similar division is evident in the disagreement between the majority and
dissent in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, where the
issue was whether exclusion from funding of student publications that "primarily
promote[] or manifest[] a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate
reality"'' 4 constituted viewpoint discrimination."' According to the majority, the
exclusion was invalid because it did not "exclude religion as a subject matter but
select[ed] for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious
editorial viewpoints. By contrast, the dissent noted that the exclusion applied
"to agnostics and atheists as well as it does to deists and theists" and so did not
"skew debate by funding one position but not its competitors."'57 Rather, it
"den[ied] funding for the entire subject matter of religious apologetics."'58 The
majority rejoined that the dissent's characterization of the relevant debate
"reflected an insupportable assumption that all debate is bipolar and that
150. Eichman, 496 U.S. at 317.
[I]f we were to hold that a State may forbid flag burning wherever it is likely to endanger the
flag's symbolic role, but allow it wherever burning a flag promotes that role-as where, for
example, a person ceremoniously bums a dirty flag-we would be... permitting a State to
"prescribe what shall be orthodox" by saying that one may burn the flag to convey one's
attitude toward it and its referents only if one does not endanger the flag's representation of
nationhood and national unity.
Id. (quoting Johnson, 491 U.S. at 416-17) (alteration in original).
151. Eichman, 496 U.S. at 318; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 416-17.
152. Eichman, 496 U.S. at 321 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 438 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("The content of respondent's message has no relevance whatsoever to the case. The concept of
'desecration' does not turn on the substance of the message the actor intends to convey, but rather on whether
those who view the act will take serious offense.").
153. Eichman, 496 U.S. at 321-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("IT]he Government may-indeed, it
should-protect the symbolic value of the flag without regard to the specific content of the flag burners'
speech. ... [T]he prohibition does not entail any interference with the speaker's freedom to express his or her
ideas by other means.").
154. 515 U.S. 819, 825 (1995) (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 66a).
155. Id. at 893 (Souter, J., dissenting).
[T]he Court recognizes that the relevant enquiry in this case is not merely whether the
University bases its funding decisions on the subject matter of student speech; if there is an
infirmity in the basis for the University's funding decision, it must be that the University is
impermissibly distinguishing among competing viewpoints.
Id.
156. Id. at 831.
157. Id. at 895-96 (Souter, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 896 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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antireligious speech is the only response to religious speech."'5 9 The dissent,
however, claimed that the majority "all but eviscerated the line between
viewpoint and content," noting that, under the Court's reasoning, "primarily
religious and antireligious speech, grouped together, [will] always provide[] an
opposing (and not merely related) viewpoint to any speech about any secular
topic" and so render impossible exclusion from government-created forums of
speech about "the desirability of religious conversion." '16
The majority and dissent in Rosenberger differed in another way on the
scope of the regulation before the Court. The majority characterized the
exclusion of publications that "primarily promot[e] or manifes[t] a particular
belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality," as "a sweeping restriction on
student thought and student inquiry."'' According to the majority, "under-
graduates named Karl Marx, Bertrand Russell, and Jean-Paul Sartre would
likewise have some of their major essays excluded from student publications."'' 62
The dissent disagreed, noting that the majority's broad interpretation of the
application of the exclusion "reads the word 'primarily' . . . right out of the
Guidelines."'63
In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, the plurality upheld the exclusion of
political or public issue advertising from a city's buses.' 64 Although the Justices
did not then focus on the content/viewpoint distinction, the Court has later
described the case as involving content discrimination.' 65 Justice Brennan, in
dissent, however, pointed out how, at a different level of generality, the
distinction between commercial and political advertisements can be viewpoint-
based: "For instance, a commercial advertisement peddling snowmobiles would
be accepted, while a counter-advertisement calling upon the public to support
legislation controlling the environmental destruction and noise pollution caused
by snowmobiles would be rejected." 1'6
159. Id. at 831-32.
It is as objectionable to exclude both a theistic and an atheistic perspective on the debate as it
is to exclude one, the other, or yet another political, economic, or social viewpoint. The
dissent's declaration that debate is not skewed so long as multiple voices are silenced is
simply wrong; the debate is skewed in multiple ways.
160. Id. at 898-99 (Souter, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 836 (alterations in original).
162. Id. at 837.
163. id. at 896 (Souter, J., dissenting).
164. 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974).
165. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 n.6 (1992) (describing Lehman as involving
"reasonable and viewpoint-neutral content-based discrimination in [a] nonpublic forum[].").
166. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 317 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 319 n.10 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 319 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit
Dist., 434 P.2d 982, 986-87 (Cal. 1967)).
In Wirta, Justice Mosk, while reviewing a similar restriction of "political" advertising, wrote
"A cigarette company is permitted to advertise the desirability of smoking its brand, but a
cancer society is not entitled to caution by advertisement that cigarette smoking is injurious to
health. A theater may advertise a motion picture that portrays sex and violence, but the
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In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court determined the constitutionality of an
ordinance that prohibited symbolic speech "which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion or gender."'67 According to Justice Scalia, writing for
the Court, the ordinance was content-based because "[d]isplays containing abusive
invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are permissible unless they are
addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics."' '6 Additionally, he found that
"[i]n its practical operation.., the ordinance goes even beyond mere content
.• • .. ,,169
discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination. As he interpreted the scope
of the statute, it allowed proponents of racial tolerance and equality to use
fighting words that those advocating racial hatred could not. '70 The example he
created was that "[o]ne could hold up a sign saying ... that all 'anti-Catholic
bigots' are misbegotten; but not that all 'papists' are, for that would insult and
provoke violence 'on the basis of religion.""
7
'
Justice Stevens interpreted the scope of the St. Paul ordinance differently,
which caused him to characterize its application as "evenhanded.",17' He saw no
difference in treatment between advocates of tolerance and of racial hatred.
Rather, he saw the Court's "anti-Catholic bigots" example as missing the point.'
74
According to Justice Stevens, the response to such a sign "is a sign saying that
Legion for Decency has no right to post a message calling for clean films. A lumber company
may advertise its wood products, but a conservation group cannot implore citizens to write to
the President or Governor about protecting our natural resources. An oil refinery may
advertise its products, but a citizens' organization cannot demand enforcement of existing air
pollution statutes."
Id.
167. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380 (quoting St. Paul, Minn., St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, Legis.
Code § 292.02 (1990)).
168. Id. at 391.
169. Id.
170. Id.
Displays containing some words-odious racial epithets, for example-would be prohibited
to proponents of all views. But "fighting words" that do not themselves invoke race, color,
creed, religion, or gender-aspersions upon a person's mother, for example-would
seemingly be usable ad libitum in the placards of those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc.,
tolerance and equality, but could not be used by those speakers' opponents.
Id.
171. Id. at 391-92.
172. Id. at 435 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
173. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
In a battle between advocates of tolerance and advocates of intolerance, the ordinance does
not prevent either side from hurling fighting words at the other on the basis of their
conflicting ideas, but it does bar both sides from hurling such words on the basis of the
target's "race, color, creed, religion or gender." To extend the Court's pugilistic metaphor, the
St. Paul ordinance simply bans punches "below the belt"-by either party.
Id.
174. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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'all advocates of religious tolerance are misbegotten.""75 In this case, "neither
sign would be banned by the ordinance for the attacks were not 'based on...
religion' but rather on one's beliefs about tolerance."'76
In Hill v. Colorado, Justices differed both on the characterization of a
restriction on "protest, education and counseling" and its practical operation.'77
Justice Kennedy, in dissent, stated,
Under the most reasonable interpretation of Colorado's law, if a speaker
approaches a fellow citizen.., and chants in praise of the Supreme
Court and its abortion decisions, I should think there is neither protest,
nor education, nor counseling. If the opposite message is communicated,
however, a prosecution to punish protest is warranted.'78
The majority disagreed, responding, "[t]he statute is not limited to those who
oppose abortion. It applies to the demonstrator in Justice Kennedy's example."' 79
IV. THE SOLUTION
For the content-based/content neutral and the content/viewpoint discrimination
determinations to continue to play meaningful roles in free speech clause doctrine,
the current confusion must end. An acceptable solution in both areas must meet
two requirements. The first, as with any point in constitutional doctrine, is that the
defining inquiry implement the values that underpin the constitutional guarantee.
The second, which is not always a requirement, but which has become crucial in
this particularly confused area, is that the inquiries depend upon bright lines that
can be applied by the Court, lower courts and government officials attempting to
regulate speech in a constitutional manner.
These two requirements conflict somewhat. An inquiry well-tailored to
implement free speech values depends upon evaluating multiple factors that do not
mesh well with bright lines. It is possible to reconcile the two goals, however,
seriatim. Bright lines must establish the initial categorization-content-
based/content neutral or content/viewpoint-based. The current confusion results
from the creeping insertion of factors that go to the weight and legitimacy of the
government purpose and the relationship of the means to the end into the initial
categorization. These many factors are relevant and important, but they must be put
into a place where courts can evaluate them openly and together. This place is the
purpose and means/end analysis that follows either categorization. Insisting on a
175. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
176. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
177. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
178. Id. at 769 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 725.
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firm placement of the many variables that must influence the validity of a
government speech action will clarify and legitimize the doctrine.
A. Content-Based/Content Neutral
1. A Clear Statement of the Test
The content-based/content neutral inquiry requires clarification in two
respects. The first is whether the face of the government action and/or its
justifications determine the categorization. The second is clarification as to the
meaning of "content." Is it limited to viewpoint or subject matter classifications
or is it broader?
a. On the Face vs. Justifications
Two inquiries currently influence the content-based/content neutral
determination: (1) a review of the lines drawn on the face of the government
action;"O and (2) a review of the government's purpose for those lines."' The
Court gives these inquiries different weights in different cases, and assesses their
interaction differently in different contexts.
Specifically, it is not clear how to characterize a government action when it
is content-based under one inquiry but content neutral under the other. The Court
has sometimes used the "justified without reference to the content" requirement
to find a facially content-based action content neutral because its purpose is to
combat nonspeech secondary effects. 12 The scope of the secondary effects that
can sanitize a content-based action, however, is not clear.'83 The Court has also at
times implied that the inquiry may go the other way: that a content-based purpose
can render a content neutral statute content-based.' 84 Yet almost always it has
rejected such showings of "underlying purpose," repeating that it "will not strike
down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit
motive. ' " 5
180. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)
(finding that a statute restricting speech about crime is content-based).
181. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (determining that a purpose to
address nonspeech secondary effects makes facially content-based action content neutral).
182. Id. (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976)) (emphasis omitted).
183. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (concluding that listener reactions are not secondary
effects); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 430 (1993) (finding that clutter is not a
secondary effect when it does not differ according to the content of speech).
184. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) ("[W]hile a content-based purpose may
be sufficient in certain circumstances to show that a regulation is content-based, it is not necessary to such a
showing in all cases.").
185. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 292 (2000) (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 382-83 (1968)).
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The test that best serves the value of clarity and legitimacy is the bright line
"on the face" test. The problems that haunt the content-based/content neutral
inquiry stem almost entirely from the Court's failure to adhere to the face of a
government action as its controlling feature. The question is whether such a
bright line can also serve underlying free speech clause values.
On one side of the equation, the Court has, in effect, already decided that the
bright line should control. Although the Court occasionally mentions that an
actual content-based purpose can corrupt a facially content neutral action, it
almost never labels an action according to this determination."' It reasons that the
government will usually be able to articulate plausible legitimate justifications
for otherwise valid lines apparent on the face of its action.' 7 It will be rare that
sufficient evidence exists to demonstrate that the purpose of a facially neutral
action is content- or viewpoint-based, and that the proffered neutral justification
is, in fact, a sham. The debate among the Justices in Hill v. Colorado illustrates
this tension.' 8 The majority found the "protest, education and counseling" ban
content neutral because of its hypothetical applications to speakers other than
abortion protesters, although they were its obvious aim.'89 The dissenters found
the evidence of its motivation combined with its effect to render it content-
based. "o In any event, in the rare circumstance where the evidence is overwhelming,
the values that underpin the free speech clause require that the content-based
label apply.' But in most instances, where such evidence does not exist, the
government will prevail in attaching the content neutral label.
The bright line rule of looking to the face of a government action to
determine its level of scrutiny is imperfect. It favors the government where it can
craft its rule in a way that is content neutral and so may lessen the scrutiny
applied to certain "[c]lever content-based restrictions."'9 This balance between
the virtues of a bright line rule and of a more nuanced inquiry is acceptable in
other constitutional contexts and so should be acceptable in the speech arena as
well. That the government must craft its rule to be content neutral on its face
limits the extent to which the government can covertly accomplish content-based
186. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 383; City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 277.
187. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 384 (suggesting that legislators will usually be able to articulate valid
purposes for such statutes that Congress has the power to enact).
188. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
189. Id. at 725.
190. Id. at 769 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191. The Court has found an unconstitutional purpose to be a reason to invalidate a government action
in other areas as well. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1964) (holding that the closing of
schools to avoid desegregation is unconstitutional); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1960)
(finding that a gerrymandered statute still leaves no doubt as to its discriminatory purpose and so is
unconstitutional); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 545-46 (1993)
(concluding that the purpose of the statute is to target religious practice and so it is unconstitutional).
192. Hill, 530 U.S. at 767 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Note, however, that the Hill rule is not properly
characterized as content neutral when "content" is understood to mean "communicative impact," and so the Hill
rule is properly labeled content-based for a different reason than advocated by Justice Kennedy.
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purposes in this way.'93 Delving into government motivation to examine that
neutrality further is uncertain, indeterminate, and, like the bright line presumption,
imperfect.'94 Compared to the certainty that a bright line rule provides, the benefits
of a thorough judicial canvassing of government motivation do not outweigh its
costs in constitutional inquiry.
So, the rule must be that a government action is content-based if it either
appears on the face or it is the government's actual purpose. This rule captures
the proper scope of dangerous behavior by the government. Dangerous behavior
is when the government considers content when taking action against private
speakers. This occurs when either the face or the actual purpose of a government
action is content-based. In application, however, this rule does not introduce
significant uncertainty into the constitutional inquiry because mustering a
sufficient demonstration of "actual purpose" is so difficult to do. It is, in effect, a
bright line rule.
The Court has been consistent in applying the bright line rule of "on the
face" content neutrality. It is in the opposite circumstance of "on the face"
content discrimination that the Court has created inroads. Why a different
balance should affect the "on the face" underlying purpose determination in this
context is not clear. Rather, the same considerations apply. A bright line rule is
imperfect, but the benefits of clarity and legitimacy outweigh any greater
precision that a more thorough inquiry may produce at the categorization stage.
The rule in this circumstance must be as follows: where the face of a
government action betrays a content-based line, the government action should be
characterized as content-based. Period. This rule will condemn some government
actions to strict scrutiny that do not pose as great a danger of government
censorship of ideas as others, but that is the nature of categorization. If categories
are to apply, actions that are facially content-based belong on the dangerous side
of the line. The different characteristics and effects of different types of
government actions remain relevant in the analysis that follows the initial
categorization. Here, a court can discuss them openly and perhaps, even in strict
scrutiny, validate a facially content-based government action.' 95
Any less-bright line leads to the problems that currently exist with the
"justified without reference to the content" test generally and the secondary
effects rationale particularly. Such a test involves the Court in highly malleable
subjective inquiries. It creates confusion among lower courts, litigants and
government officials as they try to determine what type of secondary effects may
be sufficient to sanitize a facially content-based action. It invites all of these
agents to extend content-based rules into contexts beyond the sexual speech
193. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 676 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
194. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (stating that "[i]nquiries into congressional
motives or purposes are a hazardous matter.").
195. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198, 211 (1992).
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where it was created.'96 All of these effects lead to uncertainty, which leads to
inconsistent applications, which restrict and chill protected speech.
b. The Meaning of "Content"
Knowing where to look is not enough to clarify the content inquiry. It is also
necessary to clarify the meaning of "content" to determine what lines-on the
face or in the justification of a government action-are suspect. Both the values
that underpin the free speech clause and the need for a bright line support a broad
scope for the category of "content-based." Government action taken because of
disagreement with a private message may be the most egregious type of content
discrimination, 97 and subject matter distinctions may present the most obvious
danger to skewing the market for free speech, but neither exhausts the scope of
the free speech guarantee. Government action taken with consciousness of
content is dangerous as well.' 98 The government may try to promote particular
viewpoints as well as suppress them. It may also do so with respect to certain
subject matters, and with respect to certain ways of speaking. All of these efforts
affect the mix, impact and meaning of private communication. Moreover, to the
extent that content discrimination is suspect because it may hide purposeful
viewpoint discrimination or result in the same effects, government actions
beyond subject matter distinctions carry this danger.
For all these reasons, the proper meaning of "content" is communicative
impact. 99 The appropriate question, when examining a government action, is
whether its application depends upon the communicative impact of the speech
affected. If so, then the action is content-based. The area of ambiguity in
applying this rule is determining the significance of the face of the government
action. But this meaning of content-based can be applied by a bright line inquiry:
on the face of the government action, is it necessary to understand the meaning of
the words or images to apply the rule?"'
The bright line question-is it necessary to understand the content of a
speaker's speech to apply the rule?-establishes that the scope of the content
inquiry is not viewpoint, or subject matter, but most broadly, communicative
impact. As one example, such a test would resolve the debate among the Justices
196. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
197. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
198. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971); United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529
U.S. 803, 818 (2000).
199. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 658 (1994) (stating that government action is
suspect if it is concerned with communicative impact (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17 (1976))).
200. An alternate way of asking the question is: Can the speaker change the application of the inquiry
by changing the words or images presented? See John Hart Ely, Comment, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in
the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1498
(discussing Cohen v. California and suggesting that "[hiad [the] audience been unable to read English, there
would have been no occasion for the regulation.").
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whether chanting in favor of abortion would be prohibited by the Colorado
ordinance at issue in Hill v. Colorado.2'° Applying the rule that prohibits "protest,
education, or counseling" requires understanding of the communicative impact of
the expression. The rule is content-based and strict scrutiny applies. This clear
rule avoids characterizations that appear result driven.2 2 Considering many
factors-including the weight of the government interest, the additional location
restriction, and other ways to achieve the government's purpose-is necessary to
reach the result.03 The bright line categorization puts these factors where they
belong-in a rigorous analysis that acknowledges the danger always present in a
content classification and that requires that all of the factors be weighed and
balanced together in light of this danger.
In sum, the virtue of the bright line rule is the legitimacy that comes from
certainty of application combined with its implementation of free speech values.
The implementation is less precise at the initial categorization level than a more
nuanced inquiry. But the nuanced inquiry suffers from a fatal indeterminacy. The
bright line rule occupies a middle ground between speech protection and respect
for democratic government action. It captures more government actions as
content-based than the current inquiry, making government actions that are
facially content-based less likely to survive because strict scrutiny is the level of
review. It places a broad range of government actions that are facially content
neutral into intermediate scrutiny, although they may have great disproportionate
impact and even a content-based motivation. In both of these instances, it is the
means/end analysis that considers the nuances, which adds legitimacy to the
ultimate determinations, openly evaluating and balancing the factors such as
government interest, additional location restrictions, and alternative means to
achieve the government purpose.
2. The Relevance of Effects
Although purpose is important to the constitutionality of a government action
under the free speech guarantee, effects are important as well. Both speech and
nonspeech effects are important. Speech effects cast doubt on an action's
constitutionality, while nonspeech effects may support it. For this reason, as well
as for general clarity, the two types of effects should be considered in the same
place in the constitutional analysis. The appropriate place is after the initial
categorization, in considering the weight of the government purpose and the
201. 530 U.S. 703, 769 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 725; see also supra notes 188-90 and
accompanying text.
202. Hill, 530 U.S. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of running an "ad hoc nullification
machine" favoring the abortion right).
203. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199, 208-11 (1992) (considering these factors and upholding a
restriction of political speech in the area around polling places).
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precision with which the means address it. The effects should not be smuggled by
bits and pieces into the content-based/content neutral inquiry.
a. Nonspeech "Secondary" Effects
Content neutral effects, even if a legitimate target of a content-based action,
should not make the action content neutral. As with determining the "actual
purpose" of a content neutral law, it is simply too difficult to tell why the
government "actually" took a facially content-based action."', In both of these
situations, the line on the face of the government action is the best proof of its
purpose and should control the content-based/content neutral determination.
Also, so-called "secondary effects" are inevitably linked to the content of the
expression.' °5 Why is it that crime and neighborhood deterioration occur near
adult theaters? It is because criminals and others who may reduce the quality of a
neighborhood are attracted by the sexual speech content. Although the purported
aim of the legislature is to suppress the conduct of people who are not speaking,
the means is to limit the lawful speech that draws them. The speaker/actor
correlation is the reason why a content-based line on the face of the statute is
well tailored to serve the government purpose. It is also the reason that the
content-based line poses a free speech danger.04
The potential expansion of the secondary effects rationale beyond the area of
sexual speech further illustrates why it is an inappropriate means of
categorization. One court, following Hill, which did not rely on a secondary
effects rationale, articulated it in upholding a similar restriction on "protest,
education or counseling" around abortion clinics. Although it did not rely on the
secondary effects reasoning to find the government action content neutral, it used
the language, noting the legislature's purpose to "combat[] the deleterious
secondary effects of anti-abortion protests. ' '2° Probably because of the
uncertainty of the concept, litigants argue it in contexts beyond sexual speech.28
204. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 335 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) ("[Slecondary effects offer countless excuses for content-based suppression of political speech.").
205. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment) ("The fiction [that a Renton-type ordinance] is content neutral-or 'content neutral'-is perhaps
more confusing than helpful .... ); id. at 457 (Souter, J., dissenting) (proposing to call Renton-type zoning
ordinances "content correlated").
206. Id. at 457 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The risk lies in the fact that when a law applies selectively only
to speech of particular content, the more precisely the content is identified, the greater is the opportunity for
government censorship.").
207. McGuire v. Reilly, 260 F.3d 36,44 (st Cir. 2001).
208. Petitioner's Brief at 38, 39 n.22, Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003) ("[Tlhe Virginia statute
[prohibiting cross burning with intent to intimidate]-which deals not with mere fighting words, but with
virulent intimidation-presents genuine examples of secondary effects akin to those identified by the Court in
Renton... "[T]he fear and intimidation of a victim of a malicious cross burning crosses the line between
emotive reaction and tangible injury." (citing In re Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644, 651 (Ct. App. 1994).
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Casual and imprecise use of the secondary effects concept is dangerous. The
"secondary effects" referred to in this instance do not have the speaker/actor
separation of those that have placed some sexual speech restrictions in the
content neutral category. Rather, the rule limits speech so that the restricted
speakers themselves will not engage in illegal conduct. This blurs the line
between content-based and content neutral actions almost completely.
Secondary effects are properly a factor in the strict scrutiny that applies to
content-based analysis. Specifically, secondary effects go to the strength of the
government's purpose.2 Located in this position, it is clear that the government
must prove both that the speech causes the effects and their magnitude.21° Other
factors are relevant as well, such as the precision of the line drawn by the
government and the availability of other ways to achieve the government's
211
objective.
Of course, removing the secondary effects means of categorizing sexual
speech restrictions as content neutral will mean that fewer will be valid, because
they cannot pass more rigorous review. Rather than a drawback, however, this,
too, is the bright line's virtue. Placing the secondary effects inquiry where it
belongs-as part of strict scrutiny analysis-forces the question that prompted
the "secondary effects" rationale in the first place. This question is whether there
should exist a category of less protected sexually explicit speech or speech-




Should content-based effects make a facially content neutral rule content-
based? A strong content-based impact undermines many of the free speech
values that the content inquiry is designed to implement. A precisely-tailored
209. Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems in
the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 49, 60 (2000) ("The Renton approach confuses whether a
law is content based or content neutral with the question of whether a law is justified by a sufficient purpose.").
210. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 458-64 (Souter, J., dissenting) (demanding evidence that
secondary effects exist, that they are caused by the expressive activity subject to the government action and that
the government action can be expected either to reduce them or enhance the government's ability to combat
them).
211. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
212. Compare City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 294 (2000).
[Als Justice Stevens eloquently stated for the plurality in Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70... (1976), "even though we recognize that the First Amendment will
not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it
is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different,
and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate ....
with Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 811, 814 (finding that restriction on indecent programming is
content-based and subject to strict scrutiny; the speech is not obscene and so "adults have a constitutional right
to view it").
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inquiry would categorize a government action as content-based when its content
impact reaches a certain threshold."" The problem, however, is that a multi-
factored inquiry at this stage is uncertain and malleable. It is difficult to establish
the threshold for content-based effects that would change the content neutral
rule's categorization. 2 4 Even after identifying a threshold, the effects of any
government action cannot be quantified precisely. This reality suggests that the
content neutrality of the face and justification of a government action should
control.
Content-based effects should be an important part of the intermediate
scrutiny that applies to content neutral government action. The Court recently
revived disproportionate impact as a factor that can, in combination with the
other intermediate scrutiny considerations, invalidate a facially content neutral
government action."' A robust disproportionate impact analysis in this location
serves free speech clause values. In the balancing analysis, a court can weigh the
content-based effects against the purpose of the action and the scope of its
application. So, a content neutral injunction directed solely at abortion protesters
would be analyzed under intermediate scrutiny.26 That it applies because of
previous illegal actions of those speakers would weigh in its favor.217 By contrast,
a general ban of picketing around medical facilities would be content neutral but
would not as likely be constitutional because its disproportionate impact on
abortion protesters would weigh against it.
A bright line content inquiry puts the significance of location restrictions in
its proper place-in the tailoring inquiry."' The question is whether the location
limit lessens or accentuates the dangerous free speech impact. So, with a content-
based rule, like the Hill ordinance limiting "protest, education, or counseling,"
the fact that it applies to the most effective area for abortion protesters to speak
weighs against it; that it applies only within eight feet of a person and leaves
open the rest of the medical clinic facility enhances its tailoring if protecting
unwilling listeners is a legitimate government goal. 2t 9 By contrast, a content
213. Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615
(1991) (arguing for a nuanced inquiry).
214. The debate among the Justices in Hill illustrates this difficulty. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703
(2000).
215. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 163 (2002)
("[D]oor to door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people." (quoting
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 144-46 (1943))).
216. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1994) (stating that a state law would
"equally restrain similar conduct directed at a target having nothing to do with abortion ... .
217. Id.
218. But see Hill, 530 U.S. at 723 (stating that the statute limiting "protest, education and counseling"
in certain areas outside medical facilities "simply establishes a minor place restriction on an extremely broad
category of communications with unwilling listeners."); id. at 767 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("By confining the
law's application to the specific locations where the prohibited discourse occurs, the State has made a content-
based determination.").
219. Id. at 723 (noting that the rule "simply establishes a minor place restriction on an extremely broad
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neutral restriction of speech around the entire area of an abortion clinic would
likely be unconstitutional because the location restriction focuses the impact of
the rule on abortion protesters without limiting its impact as well.
B. Content/Viewpoint
When the government restricts private speech, either content or viewpoint
discrimination leads to strict scrutiny review. So, the content/viewpoint
determination is crucial only when the government in one way or another assistsS "221
private speakers. And, the significance of the determination is greater than in
the content-based/content neutral context because the levels of review that apply
are the extremes-strict scrutiny if the action is viewpoint discriminatory but if
• • 222
not, then rational basis review.
The high stakes of the inquiry have warped it. So, too, have the different
forms of government aid and the reaction of the Court and individual Justices to
it. The Court's struggle in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley22 to find
the requirement that the NEA "tak[e] into consideration general standards of
decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public"
• • • . 224
not to be viewpoint discriminatory, and the concurring and dissenting Justices'
responses illustrate these effects. The Court reasoned that because the provision
introduced vague, 22' nonmandatory "considerations '' 226 into a funding decision
where the government should have leeway, 2 it did not "engender the kind of
directed viewpoint discrimination that would prompt [the] Court to invalidate a
statute on its face." Justice Scalia concurred, arguing that the provision
category of communications with unwilling listeners."). The Hill Court uses these considerations to bolster its
argument that the rule is content neutral rather than in the means/end inquiry where they belong.
220. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992) ("[The] Court has held that the First Amendment's
hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to a restriction on a particular viewpoint, but also to a
prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.").
221. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587-88 (1998) ("[A1lthough the First
Amendment certainly has application in the subsidy context, we note that the Government may allocate
competitive funding according to criteria that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a
criminal penalty at stake."); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983)
("Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of
subject matter and speaker identity.").
222. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 682 (1998) ("To be consistent with the
First Amendment, the exclusion of a speaker from a nonpublic forum must not be based on the speaker's
viewpoint and must otherwise be reasonable in light of the purpose of the property.").
223. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
224. Id. at 576 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)).
225. Id. at 583 (stating that the considerations are "susceptible to multiple interpretations").
226. Id. at 582 (noting that the statute "admonishes the NEA merely to take 'decency and respect' into
consideration").
227. Id. at 587 (stating that the government may selectively fund a program without discriminating
according to viewpoint).
228. Id. at 583.
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"unquestionably constitutes viewpoint discrimination,"'' 9 but that because the
government was funding speech, the First Amendment did not apply.3° Justice
Souter, in dissent, agreed that the provision was "the very model of viewpoint
discrimination,"23' but rejected the notion that the form of government aid-
232funding-rendered the discrimination constitutional. Even more than the
content-based/content neutral inquiry, the content/viewpoint determination
requires clarity and the legitimacy that this can bring.
Because the content/viewpoint inquiry applies only to a limited range of
government actions that impact speech, a crucial question must precede it. This is
whether the speech is by the government or is private. Only if it is private must
the inquiry proceed. If the speech is private, then the fundamental question is
whether the government excludes perspectives on an otherwise permissible
subject. This inquiry breaks down into two substantive determinations and two
procedural determinations. Substantively, these determinations are whether the
boundaries of aid are legitimate and not viewpoint-based, and whether the
boundaries are reasonably related to a legitimate government interest.
Procedurally, these determinations are whether specific guidelines limit the
possibility of viewpoint discrimination in administration of the aid, and whether
the aid is administered consistently according to the guidelines.
1. Private, Not Government, Speech
The content/viewpoint determination only matters when the government
impacts private speech.'. The government can discriminate in its speech
according to viewpoint. 2 4 This is because fulfilling the functions of government
require it to distinguish among policies and points of view. 3' Because it is
legitimately responsive to the democratic majority, it is primarily politics that
limits the speech of the government, not the Constitution's free speech
229. Id. at 593 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
230. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J. concurring in the judgment) ("I regard the distinction between 'abridging'
speech and funding it as a fundamental divide, on this side of which the First Amendment is inapplicable.").
231. Id. at 606 (Souter, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 613 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("When the government acts as patron, subsidizing the expression
of others, it may not prefer one lawfully stated view over another.").
233. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995) ("A holding that the
University may not discriminate based on the viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates does not
restrict the University's own speech, which is controlled by different principles.").
234. Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) ("[V]iewpoint-based funding decisions
can be sustained in instances in which the government is itself the speaker..."); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
194 (1991) ("When Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other countries to
adopt democratic principles, 22 U.S.C. § 441 l(b), it was not constitutionally required to fund a program to
encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as communism and fascism.").
235. Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 606 (1980) ("Government has
legitimate interests in informing, in educating, and in persuading.").
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guarantee. 26 But when the government assists private speakers in a way that does
not constitute government speech, the Constitution's ban on viewpoint
discrimination applies. 211 So, where the government aids private speakers, the
initial question must be whether the resulting speech is by the government or is
private speech. 38
No one test exists to make the government/private speech determination. A
number of factors are relevant to the analysis, which looks generally at the nature
of the government aid program and the degree to which the government identifies
itself with the content of the private expression. It is beyond the scope of this
article to analyze the application of the factors in particular contexts.m What is
crucial here is that the government/private speech determination occur first, and
remain distinct from, the content/viewpoint determination. Different factors are
relevant to the two determinations. Mixing them is one cause of the current
confusion. The initial inquiry must focus solely on who is speaking according to
articulated standards that can be applied in subsequent cases. Only if the speech
is private must the content/viewpoint inquiry occur.
2. All Perspectives Included
The initial inquiry immunizes a range of government/private speech
interactions from free speech clause review. After the range of legitimate
government speech is excised, however, the fact that the government assists
236. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) ("When the
government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end,
accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected
officials later could espouse some different or contrary position.").
237. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 548-49 ("Where private speech is involved, even Congress' [sic] antecedent
funding decision cannot be aimed at the suppression of ideas thought inimical to the Government's own
interest.").
238. See generally Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who's Talking? Disentangling Government and Private
Speech, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 35 (2002).
239. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618
(4th Cir. 2002).
Our sister circuits have examined (1) the central "purpose" of the program in which the
speech in question occurs; (2) the degree of "editorial control" exercised by the government
or private entities over the content of the speech; (3) the identity of the "literal speaker"; and
(4) whether the government or the private entity bears the "ultimate responsibility" for the
content of the speech, in analyzing circumstances where both government and a private entity
are claimed to be speaking.
Id. Jacobs, supra note 238, at 56 (indicating that the characteristics of legitimate government speech are
"accountability for speaking, identifiable message, and non-speech-suppressing impact"); Randall P. Bezanson
& William G. Buss, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1510 (2001) ("[G]overnment should be able to act as a speaker only
when it does so purposefully, with an identified message, which is reasonably understood by those receiving it
to be the government's message.").
240. For such analysis applied, see Jacobs, supra note 238, at 88-112 (analyzing the application of the
government speech analysis in the context of signs, license plates, advertising and public-private events;
Bezanson & Buss, supra note 239 (analyzing case studies and paradigms).
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private speakers or the particular form of the government assistance should not
further impact the content/viewpoint determination. One test should apply to all
government actions. For legitimacy, the test should be as clear as possible and
should encompass the entire range of dangerous government action.
As with the content-based/content neutral inquiry, the range of dangerous
government action in the content/viewpoint inquiry extends beyond particularly
malevolent targeting of disliked points of view. A government action that
demonstrates viewpoint consciousness poses free speech clause dangers as well.
Consequently, statements of the content/viewpoint test that require the
government to "ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas," 41 or "manipulate[]"
its aid "to have a 'coercive effect" '' are too narrow. The test should be, as the
Court has emphasized in the context of aid denied to religious speech, whether
the government excludes some perspectives on "a subject otherwise permitted" in
the forum. 243
The test, of course, is more easily stated than applied. The content/viewpoint
determination must occur because the government has acted to assist some
speakers by creating a private speech "forum" and is involved in a continuing
way in administering it. Viewpoint discrimination can occur either in the forum's
creation or its administration. The content/viewpoint inquiry must therefore
incorporate both substance and procedure.
a. Substance
i. Legitimate Forum Boundaries
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the government creates a private
speech forum and is responsible for its definition.24 The government is not
required to open a private speech forum and can decide to close it as well. 245 Once
it has opened a private speech forum, however, it is responsible for adhering to
its own definition.4 So, the first step in determining whether the government
241. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (quoting Regan v. Taxation
With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983) (alteration in original)).
242. Id. (citing Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 48! U.S. 221, 237 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
243. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 109 (2001) (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993)).
244. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 680 (1998) ("[W]ith the exception of
traditional public fora, the government retains the choice of whether to designate its property as a forum for
specified classes of speakers.").
245. Id. ("By [allowing the government to limit access], we encourage the government to open its
property to some expressive activity in cases where, if faced with an all-or-nothing choice, it might not open the
property at all.").
246. Id. at 682 ("[N]onpublic forum status 'does not mean that the government can restrict speech in
whatever way it likes."') (quoting Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 687
(1992)).
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excludes some perspectives on an "otherwise permissible" subject is for the
government to identify the boundaries of its forum.
These boundaries, once identified, must be legitimate, which means that they
• • I I247
may not be, on their face, viewpoint-based. Forum boundaries can be based on
anything other than viewpoint. Permissible forum boundaries include subject
matter, mode of expression and speaker status. The "on the face" content/viewpoint
classification is, thus, delicate, since these variables may be very closely related to
viewpoint.
What a court must do is identify each forum qualification and analyze it
separately to ensure that a legitimate non-viewpoint reason explains it. The
religious speech cases display this methodology. In these cases, the Court has
identified other forum qualifications, such as speaker status249 or topics, 250 that are
viewpoint neutral. It has then examined the religious exclusion as a qualification,
finding that it excises perspectives "otherwise permissible" in the forum.25'
Finally, where the government excludes religious groups, the Court has found
that only viewpoint can explain it.
252
This same inquiry must apply to other types of exclusions as well. Most
times, forum qualifications that may correlate to viewpoint will have a legitimate
non-viewpoint reason that explains them. One difficult example is a forum
defined by "majority" 253 or "politically popular ' 254 speaker status. The status itself
247. As with the content-based/content neutral determination, this inquiry should look primarily to the
face of the government action, but overwhelming evidence of a government purpose to target a point of view
should render the action viewpoint-based as well.
248. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 683 (finding that a speaker's status is a legitimate ground for excluding speech
from a nonpublic forum); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) ("The
necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created may justify the
State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.").
249. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (determining that a restriction requiring status as a
student group is permissible); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (same).
250. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (concluding that moral development is
a permissible topic exclusion); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (same).
251. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 103, 108-09 ("[A]ny group that 'promote[s] the moral and character
development of children' is eligible to use the school building"; however, the community use policy prohibited
use "by any individual or organization for religious purposes"; the Court found that "the Club [sought] to
address a subject otherwise permitted under the rule, the teaching of morals and character, from a religious
standpoint."); id. at 109.
In Lamb's Chapel, the local New York school district similarly had adopted § 414's "social,
civic or recreational use" category as a permitted use in its limited public forum. The district
also prohibited use "by any group for religious purposes." [Lamb's Chapel,] 508 U.S. at
387.... Citing this prohibition, the school district excluded a church that wanted to present
films teaching family values from a Christian perspective. We held that, because the films
"no doubt dealt with a subject otherwise permissible" under the rule, the teaching of family
values, the district's exclusion of the church was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.
Id. at 394. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 109.
252. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 ("[T]he University does not exclude religion as a subject matter but
selects for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints.").
253. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (discussing provision that
gave one union exclusive access to school mail system because that union represented the teachers).
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seems to incorporate a point of view.255 Majority approval of the viewpoint
expressed is not a legitimate access qualification for a private speech forum.2 6
Nevertheless, where the government administers a private speech forum, it may
serve purposes where the popularity of the speakers is legitimately relevant to
their inclusion.
In Perry Education Ass'n, the union that represented the school's teachers
had access to the internal mail system whereas a challenging union did not."'
While the distinction may be based upon viewpoint, it could also be based on the
special need for communication that the union has because of its representing
status. If this is, indeed, the distinction,25 then the distinction that correlates to
viewpoint has a non-viewpoint basis as well.
In Forbes, a television station allowed some candidates, but not others, to
participate in a debate.5 9 One ground for excluding the candidate who brought
suit was that he did not have significant voter support.' 6° Certainly, this ground
correlates to viewpoint. But the purpose of the forum is to put candidates before
voters in a meaningful way, and so some threshold of popularity serves the
purpose of the forum. Access to the ballot itself requires threshold qualifications,
and so the qualification may be labeled non-viewpoint-based.
In sum, a court must inquire whether these legitimate reasons apart from
viewpoint may exist for the access qualifications in the particular context.261 If
they do, then speaker popularity may be a legitimate, non-viewpoint-based
boundary in the initial classification.
ii. Boundaries Are Reasonably Related to a Legitimate Government
Purpose
The next inquiry in the established test looks to whether the forum's
boundaries are "reasonable" in light of its purposes. 263 It is at this step where the
254. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (stating that a candidate's lack of
popular support led to his exclusion from debate).
255. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 64-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting):
256. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 304 (2000) (indicating that school, in
administering a private speech forum, cannot "place ... students who hold [minority] views at the mercy of the
majority."); Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) ("Access to a public
forum.., does not depend upon majoritarian consent.").
257. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 38-39.
258. But see id. at 62-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting this possibility, but arguing that the school
had not crafted or administered its policy to distinguish the representing union on this basis).
259. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 669.
260. Id. at 683.
261. But see id. at 693-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that such a qualification, to be valid, must
be articulated in advance to limit the possibility of viewpoint discriminatory applications).
262. In other contexts, a popularity requirement will not be explainable on a ground other than
viewpoint. Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, at 304-05 (2000).
263. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677-78, 683; Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 800 (1985).
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government must justify its qualifications as serving the purpose of the forum.
The test is not rigorous. Most qualifications will pass muster. It is at this point,
however, when a court should notice that a qualification may correlate to
viewpoint. It should then examine the facts of the particular case to ensure that
the qualification in some reasonable way actually serves a legitimate purpose of
the forum.
b. Procedure
If a forum passes the boundary/reasonableness review, a court must ask two
procedural questions. The first is whether guidelines exist that limit administrators'
discretion so that they cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination. As the forum
creator, the burden must be on the government to articulate sufficiently specific
forum boundaries so that viewpoint discrimination in application will not occur.
The second question is whether the government has been consistent in its
administration of the forum. Here, too, the burden must be on the government to
demonstrate consistent application of its specific guidelines.
i. Specific Guidelines
In a line of cases, the Court has emphasized that government administrators
may not act with "unbridled discretion" in administering access to a public
forum.264 The dangers of unbridled discretion in the hands of government licensing
authorities are twofold. First, "the mere existence of the licensor's unfettered
discretion, coupled with the power of prior restraint, intimidates parties into
censoring their own speech, even if the discretion and power are never actually
266abused."'2 65 This type of self-censorship is immune to judicial review. Second,
"the absence of express standards makes it difficult to distinguish, 'as applied,'
between a licensor's legitimate denial of a permit and its illegitimate abuse of
censorial power" because "post hoc rationalizations" are "far too easy" for
administrators to invent and very difficult for a reviewing court to discern.267
264. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150 (1969) (holding that a city ordinance is
unconstitutional because it confers "virtually unbridled and absolute power" to prohibit parades and
demonstrations); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 753, 755, 772 (1987) (invalidating
statute that conferred "unbridled discretion" on forum administrator); Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (stating that a permit system "may not delegate overly broad licensing
discretion to a government official"); Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 323 (2002) (stating that a permit
system must "contain adequate standards to guide the official's decision and render it subject to effective
judicial review").
265. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757.
266. id.
267. Id. at 758.
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To avoid these constitutional dangers, licensors and forum administrators 268
must act under "narrow, objective, and definite standards"2 69 that are subject to
judicial review. 27° That these specific, non-viewpoint-based standards exist must
be a part of the viewpoint neutrality requirement. 27' Absent such standards, the
government creates the risk that access decisions will be based upon viewpoint
272
and so the viewpoint discriminatory label must applyY.
ii. Consistent Application
If the forum access standards appear viewpoint neutral, then the final
requirement is that the government administer the forum consistently. That is,
potentially viewpoint neutral access qualifications are not viewpoint neutral if
they are applied in a viewpoint discriminatory way. So, for example, a transit
authority's policy that prohibits advertising that is "sexually explicit" or "patently
offensive" might be specific enough to avoid the viewpoint discriminatory
label. 2" The transit authority's access policy becomes viewpoint discriminatory,
however, when it prohibits condom awareness advertisements pursuant to the
policy but accepts a commercial film advertisement that contains the same degree
274of sexual innuendo. Similarly, a transit authority engages in viewpoint
discrimination when it rejects an advertisement portraying a union protest as "too
controversial" and "not aesthetically pleasing" when it otherwise accepts "a wide
array of political and public-issue speech." 27 That the government demonstrate it
has consistently administered its forum in a viewpoint neutral way must be a
requirement of the label.
268. Southworth v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 307 F.3d 566, 578 (7th Cir. 2002) ("While the
Supreme Court has never expressly held that the prohibition on unbridled discretion is an element of viewpoint
neutrality, we believe that conclusion inevitably flows from the Court's unbridled discretion cases.").
269. Forsyth County, Ga., 505 U.S. at 131 (quoting Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 150-51).
270. Thomas, 534 U.S. at 323.
271. Southworth, 307 F.3d at 579 ("Given that the risks which the Supreme Court sought to protect
against in adopting the unbridled discretion standard are risks to the constitutional mandate of viewpoint
neutrality, we conclude that the prohibition against unbridled discretion is a component of the viewpiont-
neutrality requirement.").
272. United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. S.W. Ohio Reg'l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 361
(6th Cir. 1998) ("We believe any prohibition against 'controversial' advertisements unquestionably allows for
viewpoint discrimination."); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Chi. Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir.
1985) ("We question whether a regulation of speech that has as its touchstone a government official's subjective
view that the speech is 'controversial' could ever pass constitutional muster.").
273. AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1994)
("[A]ssum[ing] arguendo that the [transit authority] ... may constitutionally proscribe sexually explicit and/or
patently offensive speech in its cars...").
274. Id. (discussing the fact that choosing between advertisements with the same degree of sexual
innuendo demonstrates unacceptable risk of viewpoint discrimination in the forum).
275. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 163 F.3d at 354-55.
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V. CONCLUSION
Like liberty, free speech "finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt." '276 This
fundamental freedom is, however, awash in a sea of confusion. Details are
haphazardly entering into all levels of analysis, so that each case threatens to
become a jurisprudence unto itself. These many considerations have their place
in a rich constitutional analysis, but they must be pushed back into a location
where they can be weighed and evaluated together. The initial content-
based/content neutral and content/viewpoint determinations that are pivotal in
free speech clause analysis must be made according to bright lines that lend
certainty and legitimacy to the constitutional adjudication.
The content-based/content neutral inquiry must look to content consciousness
on the face of the government action. One question-whether it is necessary to
understand the communication to apply the government's rule-identifies the
government actions that are content-based. Details such as the nonspeech secondary
effects that are the true target of the action or the narrow scope of its impact are
properly evaluated in the means/end inquiry that follows the initial categorization.
The content/viewpoint inquiry must look to both substance and procedure.
Where the government assists private speech, the fundamental question is
whether it excludes some viewpoints on an otherwise permissible topic. This
determination requires careful examination of the substance of the rule. As to
each access qualification, a court must ask whether anything other than a
viewpoint preference can explain it. If so, then it may be viewpoint neutral if it is
also specifically stated, to avoid viewpoint discriminatory applications of
discretion, and consistently applied.
276. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).

